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1 Introduction
The assumption that individuals behave as if maximizing their material payoffs,
despite its central role in economic analysis, is at odds with a large body of
evidence from psychology and from experimental economics. Economic agents
often pursue objectives other than actual payoff maximization. Many observed
departures from material payoff maximizing behavior arise through actions that
favor fairness or reciprocity.
Rabin (1993) argues that the parties of a transaction care about fairness in
the sense that they “like to help those who are helping them, and hurt those
who are hurting them” (pp. 1281). Fairness and reciprocity have been shown
to explain behavior in bargaining games and in trust games. For example,
in ultimatum games offers are usually much more generous than predicted by
equilibrium and low offers are often rejected. These offers are consistent with an
equilibrium in which players make offers knowing that other players may reject
allocations that appear unfair.1
Motivated by this evidence, we address the research question: “can fairness
and reciprocity facilitate cooperation?” Since this is a very broad question we
focus on infinitely repeated market games. This important class of games tells
us how firms can sustain collusive outcomes when they interact repeatedly. This
literature also tell us what are the factors that help or hinder collusion. For ex-
ample, it is now well know that concentration, barriers to entry, cross-ownership,
symmetry and multi-market contracts facilitate collusion.
The main finding of our paper is that fairness and reciprocity is yet an-
other factor that might facilitate collusion in infinitely repeated market games.
This result is consistent with findings in Rabin (1993) and (1997) which show
that in a fairness equilibrium it is possible to sustain cooperation in the one
shot Prisoners’ Dilemma and in every period of the finitely repeated Prisoners’
Dilemma.
To model fairness and reciprocity we follow Segal and Sobel (2007). We
assume that a player’s utility is additively separable in monetary and fairness
payoffs. Monetary payoffs are revenues minus costs and fairness payoffs are a
weighted average of the rivals’ monetary payoffs where the weights depend on
how the rivals’ actions are expected to differ from the fair ones. If a player
expects a rival to play a fair action then he places zero weight on that rivals’
monetary payoff. However, if a player expects a rival to play a kind (mean)
action, then he places a positive (negative) weight on that rival’s monetary
payoff. We also assume that monetary payoffs are large by comparison with
fairness payoffs.2
The paper starts by studying the impact of fairness and reciprocity on incen-
1Sobel (2005) argues that models of interdependent preferences such as reciprocity can
provide clearer and more intuitive explanations of interesting economic phenomena.
2 In Rabin (1993) and (1997) utility is additively separable in monetary and fairness payoffs
but the weight a player places on rivals’ monetary payoffs depends on his perception of the
rivals’ intentions, which are evaluated using (i) beliefs about the rivals’ strategy choices, and
(ii) beliefs about the rivals’ beliefs about his strategy.
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tives for collusion in dynamic price-setting games where players use grim trigger
punishments and where prices are strategic complements. A natural benchmark
in a collusive framework is to assume that reciprocal players believe that a rival
is fair when the rival charges exactly its agreed upon collusive price. Our first
result shows that if this is the case, then it is easier to sustain collusion in a
dynamic price game with reciprocal players than with self-interested ones.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. If reciprocal players
think that the fair price of each of their rivals is the rival’s collusive price,
then the prices set under grim trigger punishments will be lower than those
that self-interested players would set. This happens because when players are
reciprocators and expect their rivals to set unkind prices in the punishment
phase, they have an incentive to lower their own price since they derive pleasure
from hurting the rivals for their nasty behavior. If the grim trigger punishments
prices of reciprocators are lower than those of self-interested players, then Nash
punishments are harsher with reciprocal players than with self-interested ones.
Additionally, since the collusive prices are considered to be fair, there is no
impact of fairness and reciprocity on the collusive payoffs nor on the single
period deviation payoffs. Thus, the critical discount factor needed to sustain a
collusive outcome must be lower with reciprocal players than with self-interested
ones.
What if players have more general perceptions of what the fair prices of
their rivals should be? Our second result shows that if players think that fair
prices of the rivals are between the largest Nash prices of the stage game with
self-interested players and the collusive prices, and marginal costs are constant,
then it is easier to sustain collusion when players are reciprocal than when they
are self-interested.
The intuition for this result is as follows. If reciprocal players think that the
fair prices of the rivals are greater than the largest Nash prices of the stage game
with self-interested players, then Nash punishments are harsher with reciprocal
players than with self-interested ones. This is the same effect that drives our first
result. Additionally, if reciprocal players think that the fair prices are smaller
than the collusive prices, then players have an incentive to increase their own
collusive prices since they expect their rivals to set kind prices in the collusive
phase and they derive pleasure from rewarding the rivals for this kind behavior.
Clearly, these two effects make collusion more attractive to reciprocal players
than to self-interested ones. However, the unilateral single period deviation
payoff is higher with reciprocal players than with self-interested ones. This
happens because the unilateral single period deviation payoff of a reciprocal
player also includes the benefit that player derives from being treated kindly by
the rivals (the rivals are playing their collusive prices). This effect of fairness
and reciprocity makes collusion less attractive to reciprocal players than to self-
interested ones. The assumption that monetary payoffs are large by comparison
with fairness payoffs implies that the increase in collusive payoff is of first-order
whereas the increase in the unilateral single period deviation payoff is of second-
order.
Next we argue that our main finding is robust. To do that we show that fair-
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ness and reciprocity also facilitate collusion in dynamic quantity-setting games
where players use grim trigger punishments and where quantities are strate-
gic substitutes. Thus, fairness and reciprocity can facilitate collusion not only
when players actions are strategic complements but also when they are strategic
substitutes.
We also show that fairness and reciprocity can facilitate collusion in infinitely
repeated market games where players behave according to Abreu’s (1988) theory
of optimal punishments. To do that we compare the benefit of deviating today
(the unilateral single period deviation payoff minus the collusive payoff) with
the benefit of not deviating in the long run (the collusive payoff minus the payoff
of entering a punishment stage).
First, the benefit of deviating today when players use optimal punishments
is the same as when they use grim trigger punishments. As we have seen, the
assumption that monetary payoffs are large by comparison with fairness payoffs
implies that the increase in the collusive payoff due to fairness considerations
is of first-order whereas the increase in the unilateral single period deviation
payoff is of second-order. Thus, the benefit of deviating today is smaller for
reciprocators than for self-interested players no matter if players use optimal
punishments or grim trigger punishments.
Second, if reciprocal players think that the fair prices of the rivals are smaller
than the collusive prices, then the prices set on the initial path are perceived as
kind behavior and lead to positive fairness payoffs. Therefore, when the prices
of the initial path are set, the payoffs for reciprocal players are higher than those
for self-interested players . Third, it is well known that punishments during the
punishment phase are more severe when players use optimal punishments than
when they use Nash reversion strategies. If reciprocal players think that the fair
prices of the rivals are greater than the largest Nash prices of the stage game
with self-interested players, then seeing the rivals setting punishment prices
lower than Nash prices will be perceived as nastier behavior than seeing the
rivals setting Nash prices. Therefore, reciprocal players will set lower prices than
self-interested players during the punishment phase under optimal punishments.
The second and the third effects imply that the benefit from not deviating in
the long run is larger for reciprocal players than for self-interested players no
matter if players use optimal punishments or grim trigger punishments.
Our paper is related to papers that show that fairness and reciprocity can
change market outcomes in imperfectly competitive settings. Rabin (1993) in-
troduces fairness considerations into game theory using psychological games
and shows, among many other things, that a monopolist ought to set price
lower than “the monopoly price” if consumers have concerns about fairness.
Rotemberg (2006) develops a model where consumers expect firms to be some-
what altruistic towards them and they react with anger if firms prove to be
insufficiently altruistic. He shows that many of the implications of his model
are consistent with several pricing practices of firms and consumer behavior in
the lab and in actual markets.
Our paper is also related to Malueg (1992). This paper studies the impact of
cross ownerships between firms on incentives for collusion. In this paper a firm’s
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payoff is a weighted average of its own profit and the rivals’ profits. The greater
the share of the rivals’ profits in the payoff of a firm, the greater the level of
cross ownership. Malueg shows that increasing the level of cross ownership may
decrease incentives for collusion for some demand functions, especially when
the level of cross ownership is high. Finally, our paper is related to literature in
industrial organization that analyzes how firms will choose prices and product
characteristics when managers have behavioral biases. An example is Al-Najjar
et al. (2006) work on the pricing decision of firms whose managers confound
fixed, sunk and variable costs.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets-up the model.
Section 3 discusses the impact that fairness and reciprocity have on incentives
for collusion when players use grim trigger strategies. Section 4 studies the
impact of fairness and reciprocity on collusion when choice variables are strategic
complements. Section 5 considers the case when choice variable are strategic
substitutes. Section 6 shows that the results also extend to optimal punishments.
Section 7 discusses the possibility that fairness and reciprocity also facilitate
collusion in other models used to study to collusive behavior. Section 8 concludes
the paper. The Appendix contains the proofs of all results.
2 Set-up
Segal and Sobel (2007) provide an axiomatic foundation for interdependent
preferences that can reflect reciprocity, inequity aversion, altruism as well as
spitefulness. They assume that in addition to conventional preferences over
outcomes, players in a strategic environment also have preferences over strategy
profiles. We use their approach to study the impact of fairness and reciprocity
on collusion in dynamic market games.3
Consider a dynamic game, where players i = 1, 2, . . . , n, play the same stage
game over an infinite horizon t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . In each period player i chooses an
action xi ∈ Xi, and his payoff in that period is given by
ui(xi, x−i, x
f
−i) = πi(xi, x−i) + α
∑
j =i
wij(xj , x
f
ij)πj(xi, x−i), (1)
where πi(xi, x−i) represents player i’s monetary payoff, a function of player i’s
action and the actions of the rivals, x−i. The term α
∑
j =iwij(xj , x
f
ij)πj(xi, x−i)
represents player i’s fairness payoff. The function wij(xj , x
f
ij) is the weight that
player i places on player j’s monetary payoff, πj(xi, x−i), which depends on
player j’s action, xj , and player i’s perception of the fair action of player j, x
f
ij .
The parameter α > 0 is a normalization.
3Preferences for fairness and reciprocity were first modeled in the economics literature
by Rabin (1993) in the context of static games using the theory of psychological game by
Geanakoplos et al. (1989). In Rabin’s model the weight a player places on a rival’s monetary
payoffs depends on the interpretation of that rival’s intentions which are evaluated using beliefs
(and beliefs about beliefs) over strategy choices.
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The central behavioral feature of these preferences is the assumption that
players care about the intentions of the rivals. If player i expects player j to
treat him kindly, then wij(·) will be positive, and player i will wish to treat
player j kindly. If player i expects player j to treat him badly, then wij(·) will
be negative, and player i will wish to treat player j badly. If player i expects
player j to play the fair action, then wij(·) will be zero, and there is issue of
reciprocity.
We assume throughout that players’ preferences as well as their exogenous
perceptions of the fair actions of the rivals, xf−i = (x
f
i1, ..., x
f
ii−1, x
f
ii+1, ..., x
f
in)
for i = 1, ..., n, are common knowledge. Players discount the future at rate
δ ∈ (0, 1) . The repeated game payoff of player i of choosing action xi when
rivals play x−i is given by
Ui =
∞∑
t=0
ui(xi, x−i, x
f
−i)δ
t.
Denote the dynamic game with reciprocal players by Γr∞(u, x), where u =
(u1, ..., un) and x = (x1, ...., xn) and the dynamic game with self-interested
players by Γs∞(π, x), where π = (π1, ..., πn).
Players are able to sustain a collusive outcome when the payoff from col-
lusion is no less than the payoff from deviation. To understand how fairness
and reciprocity influence collusion we will compare the incentive compatibility
condition of self-interested players in Γs∞(π, x) to that of reciprocal players in
Γr∞(u, x) assuming that these two games are identical in all respects with the
exception of players’ social preferences.
To perform this analysis we focus on infinitely repeated market games. More
specifically, we consider the cases where players’ actions are strategic comple-
ments (e.g., price competition with products that are imperfect substitutes) and
strategic substitutes (e.g., quantity competition with products that are perfect
substitutes). We also consider two alternative modes of punishments after de-
viations: grim trigger and optimal punishments.
3 Grim Trigger Punishments
When players use grim trigger strategies any deviation from collusion leads to a
switch to a Nash equilibrium of the stage game forever after. Thus, when self-
interested player use grim trigger punishments in Γs∞(π, x), each player i will
prefer to play his collusive action xci if the payoff from collusion, πi(x
c
i , x
c
−i)/(1−
δ), is no less than the payoff from defection which consists of the one period
gain from deviating πi(BRsi (x
c
−i), x
c
−i) plus the discounted payoff of inducing
Nash reversion forever δπi(x
ns
i , x
ns
−i)/(1− δ), that is,
πi(BR
s
i (x
c
−i), x
c
−i) +
δ
1− δ
πi(x
ns) ≤
1
1− δ
πi(x
c).
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Solving for δ we obtain
δsxc =
πi(BR
s
i (x
c
−i), x
c
−i)− πi(x
c)
πi(BRsi (x
c
−i), x
c
−i)− πi(x
ns)
≤ δ. (2)
The collusion action profile xc can be sustained by self-interested players who
are patient enough such that δsxc ≤ δ where δ
s
xc is the critical discount factor
above which xc can be sustained by self-interested players.
The same reasoning applies when players are reciprocal. Thus, for a recip-
rocal player i to play the collusive action xci in Γ
r
∞(u, x) using a grim trigger
strategy the following condition must be satisfied
ui(BR
r
i (x
c
−i), x
c
−i, x
f
−i) +
δ
1− δ
ui(x
nr, xf−i) ≤
1
1− δ
ui(x
c, xf−i).
Solving for δ we obtain
δrxc =
ui(BRri (x
c
−i), x
c
−i, x
f
−i)− ui(x
c, xf−i)
ui(BRri (x
c
−i), x
c
−i, x
f
−i)− ui(x
nr, xf−i)
≤ δ. (3)
When players are reciprocal it follows that the collusive action profile xc can
be sustained if players are patient enough such that δrxc ≤ δ where δ
r
xc is the
critical discount factor above which xc can be sustained by reciprocal players.
We will use (2) and (3) to characterize the impact that fairness and reci-
procity have on collusion when players use grim trigger strategies. To perform
this analysis we compare the critical discount factor above which the collusive
action profile can be sustained when players are self-interested to the critical
discount factor when players are reciprocal. We assume that the two games
are identical in all respects (demand, costs, and number of players) with the
exception of players’ preferences. We say that fairness and reciprocity facilitate
collusion when the collusive action profile can be sustained at a lower critical
discount factor when players are reciprocal than when they are self-interested. If
the opposite happens we say that fairness and reciprocity make collusion harder.
3.1 Strategic Complements
We now specialize the model by assuming that choice variables are strategic
complements. This assumption means that a player’s incremental returns from
increasing his own action are increasing in the rivals’ actions. The canonical
market game where players’ actions are strategic complements is price compe-
tition with products that are imperfect substitutes. We use this game to study
the impact of fairness and reciprocity on collusion when players’ choices are
strategic complements.
Assume that in each period player i chooses price, pi, and his payoff in that
period is given by
ui(pi, p−i, p
f
−i) = πi(pi, p−i) + α
∑
j =i
wij(pij , p
f
ij)πj(pi, p−i). (4)
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As usual player i’s monetary payoff, πi(pi, p−i), is given by the difference be-
tween revenue and cost, that is,
πi(pi, p−i) = Ri (pi, p−i)−Ci(Di(pi, p−i))
= piDi(pi, p−i)−Ci(Di(pi, p−i)),
where Ri(pi, p−i) is revenue, Ci(Di(·)) is the cost of production, and Di(pi, p−i)
is the demand faced by player i. We assume that Di(·) is decreasing with pi,
increasing with p−i, and Ci(·) is increasing with Di(·). Furthermore, we assume
that
wij(pj , p
f
ij)


> 0 if pj > p
f
ij
= 0 if pj = p
f
ij
< 0 otherwise
. (5)
The assumptions on wij(·) capture the fact that a reciprocal player cares about
the intentions of the rivals. The first condition expresses constructive or positive
reciprocity. If player i expects player j’s price to be greater than the fair price,
pfij , then player i places a positive weight on j’s monetary payoffs. In this case
player i is willing to sacrifice some of its monetary payoff to increase player j’s
monetary payoff. The second condition says that if player i expects player j to
choose the fair price, then player i places no weight on j’s monetary payoffs. The
third condition expresses destructive or negative reciprocity. If player i expects
player j to set a price lower than the fair price, then player places a negative
weight on j’s monetary payoffs. In this case player i is willing to sacrifice some
of its monetary payoff to reduce player j’s monetary payoff.
Let
Ai(pi, p−i, p
f
−i) = argmax
pi∈Pi
πi(pi, p−i) + α
∑
j =i
wij(pj , p
f
ij)πj(pi, p−i),
denote the set of maximizers of player i’s stage game problem as a function of
pi, p−i and p
f
−i. For finite quantities, the players will never choose an infinite
price. Hence, the players’ price choice set is compact set in R. We assume that
ui is order upper semi-continuous in pi. The choice set being compact with this
assumption guarantees that the set of maximizers Ai(pi, p−i, p
f
−i) is nonempty.
We also assume that ui has increasing differences in (pi, p−i), that is, for any
fixed pf−i, ui(pi, p
′
−i, p
f
−i)− ui(pi, p
′′
−i, p
f
−i) is increasing in pi for all p
′
−i ≥ p
′′
−i.
This assumption guarantees that prices are strategic complements.4 Together,
4 If the payoff function is differentiable, then ui having increasing differences in (pi, p−i),
is equivalent to the assumption that the cross partial derivatives of ui with respect to pi and
pj for any player j, is non-negative, that is,
∂2ui
∂2pipj
=
∂2πi
∂2pipj
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+αwij(pj , p
f
ij)
∂2πj
∂2pipj
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+α
∂wij(pj , p
f
ij)
∂pj
∂πj
∂pi
≥ 0.
Note that if a player cares only about monetary payoffs and if the payoff function is differ-
entiable, then the increasing differences assumption boils down to ∂
2πi
∂2pipj
> 0. In the game
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these assumptions imply that Γr(u, p) is a supermodular game. This result is
stated formally in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1: If (i) Pi is a compact interval in R, (ii) ui(pi, p−i, p
f
−i) is order
upper semi-continuous in pi for fixed p−i and order continuous in p−i for a fixed
pi, and ui(pi, p−i, p
f
−i) has a finite upper bound, (iii) ui is supermodular in pi
for fixed p−i, and (iv) ui(pi, p−i, p
f
−i) has increasing differences in (pi, p−i),
then Γr(u, p) is a supermodular game.
By Milgrom and Roberts (1990) we know that if Γr(u, p) is a supermodular
game, then there exist largest and smallest serially undominated strategies for
each player, pi and pi. Moreover, the strategy profiles p and p are pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium profiles. Thus, the existence of a Nash equilibrium of the stage
game is guaranteed. Our next result shows how players’ perceptions of the fair
prices of the rivals influence the extremal equilibrium prices of this game.
Proposition 1: If Γr(u, p) is a supermodular game and ui has decreasing
differences in (pi, p
f
−i), then the smallest and the largest pure-strategy Nash
equilibria of Γr(u, p), i.e., pnr and pnr, are nonincreasing functions of pf =
(pf−1, ..., p
f
−n).
Proposition 1 is a comparative statics result that characterizes the impact
that players’ perceptions of the fair prices of their rivals have on the Nash equi-
librium prices of the stage game. This result says that the higher are players’
perceptions of what the fair prices of the rivals should be, the lower will the
equilibrium prices be. The critical condition that drives this result is the as-
sumption that the payoff function ui has decreasing differences in (pi, p
f
−i).
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This assumption says that the marginal returns from increasing prices are de-
creasing with a player’s perception of the fair prices of the rivals. This implies
that an increase in pf−i shifts the best reply of a reciprocal player i towards
origin. In other words, the higher player i perceives the fair price for the other
players to be, the more it would like to set a smaller price for any price of the
other players.
Recall that the main goal of the paper is to study how fairness and reciprocity
change the nature of dynamic price competition. An intermediate step in the
analysis is to understand how these preferences change the nature of static price
competition. To do that we will compare the set of Nash equilibria of the stage
game Γs(π, p) to that of Γr(u, p). The findings are summarized in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1: If Γr(u, p) is a supermodular game, ui has decreasing differences
in (pi, p
f
−i), and p
ns
−i ≤ p
f
−i, then (i) p
nr ≤ pns and ui(p
nr, pf−i) ≤ πi(p
ns), for
all i, and (ii) pnr ≤ pns and ui(p
nr, pf−i) ≤ πi(p
ns), for all i.
with reciprocal players and differentiable payoff functions, the assumption will be satisfied if
∂2πi
∂2pipj
> 0 and α is sufficiently small.
5 If ui is differentiable this assumption is equivalent to
∂wij(pj ,p
f
ij
)
∂p
f
ij
∂πj
∂pi
< 0 for all j.
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This result tells us if reciprocal players believe that the fair prices of the rivals
satisfy the inequality pf−i ≥ p
ns
−i, then the set of Nash equilibria of Γ
r(u, p) will
be lower than the set of Nash equilibria of Γs(π, p). In other words, if reciprocal
players believe that the fair prices of the rivals must be greater than or equal
to the largest pure strategy Nash equilibrium prices of the rivals in Γs(π, p),
then prices set by reciprocators will be lower than those set by self-interested
players.6
The result also states that if reciprocal players believe that pf−i ≥ p
ns
−i, then
the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of Γr(u, p) will be lower than the set of Nash
equilibrium payoffs of Γs(π, p).This happens because for these perceptions of fair
prices, the smallest and the largest Nash equilibria of the game with reciprocal
players are destructive reciprocity states. The belief that pf−i ≥ p
ns
−i implies
that reciprocal players expect their rivals to charge unfair prices. This implies
that reciprocal players wish to punish their rivals. They do it by setting lower
prices than self-interested players. The lower equilibrium prices reduce players’
monetary payoffs and in addition lead to payoff losses given that players feel
that their rivals are being unfair.
We now turn our attention to the infinitely repeated game. For the dynamic
game with self-interested players, Γs∞(π, p), we know from Friedman (1971)
that for a sufficiently high discount factor, there is a subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium of Γs∞(π, p) at p
c with payoff π(pc) where π(pc) is any payoff which
gives every player strictly more than the payoff of the largest Nash equilibrium
of Γs(π, p), that is, πi(pc) > πi(p
ns), for all i. Lemma 2 applies this result to
the dynamic game with reciprocal players, Γr∞(u, p).
Lemma 2: Let Γr(u, p) be a supermodular game where (i) ui has decreasing
differences in (pi, p
f
−i), for all i, (ii) p
f
ij ∈ [p
ns
j , p
c
j ] for all i and j = i. Let p
c
satisfy πi(pc) > πi(p
ns) for all i. Under these conditions there is a sufficiently
high discount factor such that there exists a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
of Γr∞(u, p) at p
c.
This result states that given the fair prices profile, pf , for any pc such that the
players’ payoffs at the collusive prices are higher than their payoffs at the largest
Nash equilibrium of the stage game, collusion can be sustained by reciprocal
players at the strategy profile pc. We are now ready to state our first result
about the impact of fairness and reciprocity on collusion.
Proposition 2: Let Γr(u, p) and Γs(π, p) be supermodular games where (i) ui
has decreasing differences in (pi, p
f
−i), all i, and (ii) p
f
ij = p
c
j for all i and j = i.
Let Nash punishments in Γr∞(u, p) and in Γ
s
∞(π, p) be either at the smallest
or largest pure strategy Nash equilibria of Γr(u, p) and Γs(π, p), respectively.
6The opposite result would hold if reciprocal players think that the fair prices of the rivals
are less than or equal to the lowest pure-strategy Nash equilibrium prices of the rivals in
Γs(π, p). However, the assumption that fair prices are greater than the largest Nash prices in
Γs(π, p) is more compelling than the assumption that they are less than the smallest Nash
prices in Γs(π, p). In fact, a natural benchmark in a collusive framework is to assume that
players believe that a rival is fair when the rival charges exactly its agreed upon collusive
price.
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Let pc satisfy πi(pc) > πi(p
ns) for all i. Under these assumptions, the critical
(minimum) discount factor needed to sustain collusion at pc is lower in Γr∞(u, p)
than in Γs∞(π, p), that is δ
r
pc < δ
s
pc .
A natural benchmark in a collusive framework is to assume that reciprocal
players believe that a rival is fair when the rival charges exactly its agreed upon
collusive price. Proposition 2 says that if reciprocal players think that the fair
price of each of their rivals is the rival’s collusive price, then it is easier to sustain
collusion when players are reciprocal than when they are self-interested.7
If reciprocal players feel that rivals who charge exactly their agreed upon
collusive price are being fair, then a unilateral deviation from the collusive price
is punished not only because this allows collusion to be sustained in equilibrium
but also because players like to punish what they consider to be an mean behav-
ior by a rival. It follows immediately that if all players think that the fair price
of each of the rivals is the rival’s collusive price, then they will set lower prices
than the self-interested Nash prices if they wish to punish the rivals for their
unfair behavior. In other words, Nash reversion punishments are harsher in the
game with reciprocal players than in the game with self-interested players since
playing Nash reversion in the game with reciprocal players leads to a destructive
reciprocity state.
Additionally, if reciprocal players feel that rivals who charge exactly their
agreed upon collusive price are being fair, then playing the collusive price implies
neither gains nor losses from fairness and reciprocity. In this case the collusive
payoff is exactly the same in the game with reciprocal players and in the game
with self-interested players. This follows from the assumption that a reciprocal
player places no weight on the rivals’ payoffs when the rivals charge exactly the
prices that a reciprocal player perceives to be fair. This also implies that the
one period deviation payoff in the game with reciprocal players is identical to
the one period deviation payoff in game with self-interested players.
Does the result obtained in Proposition 2 extend to more general perceptions
of fair prices? Proposition 3 provides conditions under which the answer to this
question is positive.
Proposition 3: Let Γr(u, p) and Γs(π, p) be supermodular games where (i)
ui has decreasing differences in (pi, p
f
−i), for all i, (ii) πi(pi, p−i) = (pi −
ci)Di(pi, p−i), and (iii) p
f
ij ∈ [p
ns
j , p
c
j ] for all i and j = i. Let Nash punish-
ments in Γr∞(u, p) and in Γ
s
∞(π, p) be either at the smallest or largest pure
strategy Nash equilibria of Γr(u, p) and Γs(π, p), respectively. Let pc satisfy
πi(p
c) > πi(p
ns) for all i. Under these assumptions, the critical (minimum)
discount factor needed to sustain collusion at pc is lower in Γr∞(u, p) than in
Γs∞(π, p), that is δ
r
pc < δ
s
pc .
7The assumption that Nash punishments in both games are either at the smallest or largest
pure strategy Nash equilibria of these games is essentially a technical condition. This condition
is necessary when the stage game has multiple equilibria since in a supermodular game we can
state unambiguous comparative static results for the largest and the smallest Nash equilibria
but not for other Nash equilibria.
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This result shows that if players think that the fair prices of the rivals are
greater than or equal to the largest Nash equilibrium prices of the stage game
with self-interest players but less than or equal to the collusive prices, and
marginal costs are constant, then it is easier to sustain collusion when players
are reciprocal than when they are self-interested.
The intuition behind this result as follows. If players think that the fair
prices of the rivals are less than the collusive prices, then collusion becomes
a constructive reciprocity state. In this case players’ monetary payoffs from
collusion are the same as the ones obtained in the game with self-interested
players but in addition there are fairness payoff gains since players think that
their rivals are being kind. This effect makes collusion more attractive when
players are reciprocal than when they are self-interested.
Additionally, if players think that the fair prices of the rivals are greater than
the largest Nash equilibrium prices of the stage game with self-interested players,
then Nash reversion becomes a destructive reciprocity state. This implies that
the punishment imposed after cheating occurs is more severe when players are
reciprocal than when they are self-interested. This happens because monetary
payoffs are lower than the payoffs of self-interested players and in addition there
are fairness payoff loses since players think that the rivals are being unkind.
This effect also makes collusion more attractive when players are reciprocal
than when they are self-interested.
However, the single period deviation payoff is higher in the game with recip-
rocal players than in the game with self-interested players. This effect makes
collusion less attractive when players are reciprocal than when they are self-
interested. This happens because the unilateral single period deviation payoff
of a reciprocal player also includes the benefit that player derives from being
treated kindly by the rivals (the rivals are playing their collusive price levels).
However, the assumption that monetary payoffs are large by comparison with
fairness payoffs implies that this effect is of second-order.8
Proposition 3 shows that this result holds provided certain conditions are
met. Clearly, the most important condition is the one about players’ perceptions
of fair prices of the rivals. As we mentioned before, we think that it is natural to
assume that players would think that if the rivals play their collusive prices the
rivals are being fair. However, it could be that players also place some weight
on consumer surplus. If this were the case, then players could think that the
fair prices of the rivals should be less than the collusive prices. We are not able
to show that our method of proof also works when we relax the assumption that
marginal costs are constant. However, we are convinced that it does since we
found that to be the case for several types of increasing marginal costs.
3.2 Strategic Substitutes
When choice variables are strategic substitutes a player’s incremental returns
from increasing his own action are decreasing in the rivals’ actions. The canon-
8The assumption that ui has increasing differences in (pi, p−i) implies that monetary
payoffs are large by comparison with fairness payoffs.
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ical market game where players’ actions are strategic substitutes is quantity
competition with products that are perfect substitutes. We use this game to
study the impact of fairness and reciprocity on collusion when players’ choices
are strategic substitutes.
Assume that in each period player i chooses quantity, qi, and his payoff in
that period is given by
ui(qi,Q−i) = πi(qi,Q−i) + αwi(Q−i, Q
f
−i)
∑
j =i
πj(qi, Q−i),
where πi(qi,Q−i) is the monetary payoff and αwi(Q−i, Q
f
−i)
∑
j =i πj(qi, Q−i) is
the fairness payoff, with α > 0. Player i’s monetary payoff, πi(qi, q−i), is the
difference between revenue and cost, that is,
πi(qi, Q−i) = Ri (qi,Q−i)−Ci(qi)
= P (Q)qi −Ci(qi),
where Ri(qi,Q−i) is revenue, Ci(qi) is the cost of production, and P (Q) is
the inverse market demand with Q =
∑
qi. We assume that P (Q) is strictly
positive on some bounded interval (0, Q¯) with P (Q) = 0 for Q ≥ Q¯. We also
assume that P (Q) is twice continuously differentiable with P ′(Q) < 0 (in the
interval for which P (Q) > 0). Players costs of production are assumed to be
twice continuously differentiable with C ′i(qi) ≥ 0. It is also assumed that the
decreasing marginal revenue property holds, that is, P ′(Q)+P ′′ (Q) qi ≤ 0, and
P ′(Q)−C′′i (qi) < 0. Furthermore, we assume that the weight that player i places
on the rivals’ aggregate monetary payoffs depends on player i’s perception of
the fair aggregate output of the rivals, Qf−i, and on the actual aggregate output
of the rivals such that
wi(Q−i, Q
f
−i)


> 0 if Q−i < Q
f
−i
= 0 if Q−i = Q
f
−i
< 0 otherwise
,
where wi(Q−i, Q
F
−i) is assumed to be differentiable in both arguments with
∂wi/∂Q−i < 0 and ∂wi/∂Q
F
−i > 0.
These conditions capture the fact that a player with reciprocal preferences
cares about the intentions of the rivals. The first condition in (5) expresses
constructive reciprocity. If player i expects the aggregate output of the rivals
to fall short of its own perception of the fair aggregate output of the rivals,
then player i is willing to sacrifice some of his payoffs to increase the rivals’
monetary payoffs. The third condition in (5) expresses destructive reciprocity.
When player i expects the rivals to produce more than player i’s perception of
the fair aggregate output of the rivals, then player i is willing to sacrifice some
of its profit to reduce the rivals’ profit.9
9Santos-Pinto (2006) shows that if monetary payoffs are not large enough by comparison
with fairness payoffs, then best replies of reciprocal players in a static Cournot oligopoly may
no longer have a negative slope accross all quantities.
The next result shows that reciprocity facilitates collusion if players think
that the fair output of their rivals is greater than or equal to the rivals’ joint
self-interested collusive output but smaller than or equal to the rivals’ joint
self-interested Nash output.
Proposition 4: If Γr(u, p) and Γs(π, p) satisfy the conditions stated and
Qf−i ∈ [Q
c
−i,Q
ns
−i] for all i, then the critical (minimum) discount factor needed to
sustain collusion at qc is lower in Γr∞(u, q) than in Γ
s
∞(π, q), that is, δ
r
qc ≤ δ
s
qc .
Proposition 4 shows that fairness and reciprocity also facilitate collusion
when players’ choices are strategic substitutes. It says that if players think that
the fair aggregate output of the rivals is greater than or equal to the collusive
output but less than or equal to the aggregate output of the rivals in the Nash
equilibrium of the stage game with self-interested players, then it is easier to
sustain collusion when players are reciprocal than when they are self-interested.
The intuition is similar to that of Proposition 3. If reciprocal players think
that the fair output of their rivals is greater than the joint self-interested col-
lusive output of the rivals, then playing the collusive output is more attractive
in the dynamic quantity-setting game with reciprocal players than in the game
with self-interested players. This happens because the collusive monetary pay-
offs are the same as the ones obtained in the game with self-interested players
but in addition there are payoff gains from constructive reciprocity since recip-
rocal players think that their rivals are being kind.
Additionally, if reciprocal players perceive that the fair output of their rivals
is smaller than the aggregate output of the rivals in the Nash equilibrium of
the stage game with self-interested players, then the punishment imposed af-
ter cheating occurs becomes more severe in the dynamic game with reciprocal
players than in the dynamic game with self-interested players. This happens be-
cause, the Nash equilibrium of the stage game with reciprocal players becomes
a destructive reciprocity state. This is bad for players since it reduces monetary
payoffs (by comparison with the monetary payoffs of self-interested players) and
leads to payoff loses from destructive reciprocity since reciprocal players think
that the rivals are being mean.
In contrast, the single period deviation payoff in the game with reciprocal
players is larger than the single period deviation payoff in the game with self-
interested players. This happens because the unilateral single period deviation
payoff of a reciprocal player also includes the benefit that player derives from
being treated kindly by the rivals (the rivals are playing their collusive outputs).
However, this effect is of second-order since monetary payoffs are larger by
comparison with fairness payoffs.
4 Optimal Punishments
So far the paper has indicated that fairness and reciprocity facilitate collusion
when players use Nash reversion to punish deviations. However, Abreu’s (1988)
theory of optimal punishments can be an alternative framework of analysis.
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This section shows that our finding also extends to the optimal punishments
framework.10
Abreu (1988) introduces a rule which consists of an initial path (that is an
infinite stream of one period action profiles) and punishments (that are also
infinite streams for any deviation from the initial path or from a prescribed
punishment). He introduces the notion of simple strategy profile in which a
specific punishments take place after any deviation for each particular player.
Thus, the simple strategy profiles have a description of (n+1) paths for an
n-player game, on the other hand an arbitrary strategy profile may consist
of infinite amount of punishments and depends on complex history-dependent
formulas.
We begin by introducing additional notations and definitions, after we show
an optimal simple penal code exists. Finally, we state conditions under which
it is easier to sustain collusion with reciprocal players than with self-interested
ones under optimal punishments.
A pure strategy of player i is denoted σi. The function for all periods t
determines player i’s action at t as a function of the actions of all players in
previous periods. Formally, at t = 1, σi(1) ∈ Pi and for t = 2, 3, ..., σi(t) :
P t−1 → Pi.
11 Player i’s strategy set is denoted Σi, and the set of strategy
profiles is denoted Σ ≡ Σ1 ×Σ2 × ...×Σn.
A path (or punishment), P˜ , is a stream of action profiles {p(t)}∞t=1 and let
Ω ≡ P∞ be the set of punishments. Any strategy profile σ ∈ Σ generates a
path denoted P˜ (σ) = {p(σ)(t)}∞t=1, and it is defined as follows: p(σ)(1) = σ(1),
and p(σ)(t) = σ(t)(p(σ)(1), ..., (p(σ)(t)).
Player i’s payoff from path P˜ ∈ Ω is given by vxi : Ω→R for x = {r, s} such
that
vxi (P˜ ) =
{ ∑∞
t=1 δ
tui(p(t)) if x = r∑∞
t=1 δ
tπi(p(t))if x = s
where ui is given by (1) and (5). Player i’s payoff function is given by v˜
x
i : Σ→R
such that v˜xi (σ) = vi(P˜ (σ)).
Abreu (1988) introduces the simple strategy profile, which is defined by
(n+ 1)-vector of paths (P˜ 0, P˜ 1, ..., P˜n) and a rule. The initial path is P˜ 0, and
for each player i ∈ {1, ..., n}, P˜ i is the punishment for player i. For any alone
deviation of player i from the ongoing path is responded by imposing P˜ i. If
more than one player deviate, the ongoing path continues to be followed and
deviators will not be punished. Formally:
Let P˜ i ∈ Ω, i = 0, 1, ..., n. The simple strategy profile σ(P˜ 0, P˜ 1, ..., P˜n)
specifies: (i) play P˜ 0 until some player deviates singly from P˜ 0; (ii) for any j ∈
{1, ..., n}, play P˜ j if the jth player deviates singly from P˜ i, i = 0, 1, ..., n, where
P˜ i is an ongoing previously specified path; continue with P˜ i if no deviations
occur or if two or more players deviate simultaneously.
10We only discuss the dynamic price-setting market game since the quantity-setting case is
very similar.
11 In optimal punishment section, the starting period is 1 for convenience.
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We interest in the simple strategy profile being perfect. The following propo-
sition indicates that assuming the set of payoffs of the stage game is bounded
(i.e.: {u(p)|p ∈ P} is bounded), the simple strategy σ(P˜ 0, P˜ 1, ..., P˜n) profile is
perfect if and only if no one-shot deviation by any player j ∈ {1, ..., n} from
P˜ i,i = 0, 1, ..., n, yields player j a higher payoff, when all players conform with
P˜ j after the deviation.
Let Σp denote the set of perfect equilibrium strategy profiles of Γ∞(δ). The
perfect equilibrium paths Ωp = {P˜ (σ)|σ ∈ Σp}, and payoffs V = {v(P˜ )|P˜ ∈
Ωp}.
We introduce three more definitions from Abreu (1988) before the existence
result. An optimal penal code is an n-vector of the strategy profiles {σ1, ..., σn}
such that for all i,
σi ∈ Σp and v˜i(σ
i) = min{v˜i(σ)|σ ∈ Σ
p}.
Let σi(P˜ 1, ..., P˜n) = σ(P˜ i, P˜ 1, ..., P˜n). The simple penal code (P˜ 1, ..., P˜n) is
the n-vector of the strategy profiles
σ1(P˜ 1, ..., P˜n), ..., σn(P˜ 1, ..., P˜n).
Finally, a simple penal code (P˜ 1, ..., P˜n) is an optimal simple penal code if it is
an optimal penal code.
Lemma 3: If Σp is non-empty, P is a compact topological space and given pf ,
u : P × pf → Rn is continuous, then an optimal simple penal code exists.
Similarly, an optimal simple penal code exists for a continuous payoff func-
tion π : P → Rn. The following result indicates the use of optimal penal code
to characterize the set of perfect equilibrium paths. Let
vxi (P˜ ; t+ 1) =
{ ∑∞
k=1 δ
kui(p(t+ k)) if x = r∑∞
k=1 δ
kπi(p(t+ k)) if x = s
,
denote player i’s present discounted payoffs from the period t+1 to∞ along the
path P˜ and vxi = v˜
x
i (σ
i), the payoff, player i will get under her optimal penal
code, where r stands for reciprocal and s for self-interested.
By Abreu (1998) we know that if an optimal penal code exists, then P˜ 0 ∈ Ωp
if and only if
ui(p
dr
i , p
0
−i(t))− ui(p
0) ≤ vri (P˜
0; t+ 1)− vri (6)
πi(p
ds
i , p
0
−i(t))− πi(p
0) ≤ vsi (P˜
0; t+ 1)− vsi (7)
The left-hand-side of inequalities (6) and (7) are the benefit of deviating
today for reciprocators and self interested players, respectively. The right-hand-
side is the benefit of not deviating in the long-run. Note that the prices in each
period of the initial path can be simply considered as the collusive prices, but
we allow them to be more general than the collusive prices.
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Since the existence of optimal simple penal code is guaranteed under the
given assumptions, our final result shows that fairness and reciprocity facilitate
collusion when players use optimal simple penal codes.
Proposition 5: Assume (i) ui has decreasing differences in (pi, p
f
−i), for all
i, (ii) πi(pi, p−i) = (pi − ci)Di(pi, p−i), and (iii) p
f
ij ∈ [p
ns
j , p
c
j ] for all i and
j = i. Let p0 satisfy πi(po) > πi(p
ns) for all i. If an optimal simple penal code
exist, then the critical (minimum) discount level to sustain collusion at P˜ 0is
lower in the game with reciprocal players Γr∞(n, u, p, P
f ) than in the game with
self-interested players Γs∞(n, π, p), that is δ
r
p0 < δ
s
p0.
The intuition of this result is as follows. First, the benefit of deviating
today when players use optimal punishments is the same as when they use grim
trigger punishments. Proposition 3 shows that if monetary payoffs are large by
comparison with fairness payoffs, then the increase in the collusive payoff due
to fairness considerations is of first-order whereas the increase in the unilateral
single period deviation payoff is of second-order. Thus, the benefit of deviating
today is smaller for reciprocators than for self-interested players no matter if
players use optimal punishments or grim trigger punishments.
Second, if reciprocal players think that the fair prices are smaller than the
collusive prices, then the prices set on the initial path are perceived as kind
behavior by the other players and lead to positive fairness payoffs. Therefore, the
payoffs for reciprocal players are higher than for self-interested players when the
prices of the initial path are set. Finally, it is well known that punishments are
more severe when players use optimal punishments than the punishment phase
of Nash reversion strategies. Setting such low punishment prices is perceived
as extremely unkind behavior if reciprocal players think that the fair prices
of the rivals are greater than the largest Nash prices of the stage game with
self-interested players. Therefore, reciprocal players set smaller prices than self-
interested players during the punishment phase no matter if players use optimal
punishments or grim trigger punishments. These three effects imply that fairness
and reciprocity also facilitate collusion when players use optimal punishments.
5 Conclusion
This paper shows that fairness and reciprocity can facilitate collusion in infi-
nitely repeated market games. This result is valid not only when players’ choices
are strategic complements but also when they are strategic substitutes. The re-
sult also holds no matter if players use grim trigger punishments or optimal
punishments.
Our analysis was focused on models of collusion without uncertainty or pri-
vate information. Studying the impact of fairness and reciprocity in more real-
istic models of collusion is a promising avenue for research.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: According to Milgrom and Roberts (1990), a game Γ(u, x)
is supermodular if (i) the choice set is a compact interval in R, (ii) ui is order
upper semi-continuous in xi for x−i and order continuous in x−i for a fixed xi,
and it has a finite upper bound, (iii) ui is supermodular in xi for fixed x−i, and
(iv) ui has increasing differences in (xi, x−i).
The price stage game with reciprocal players Γr(u, p) satisfies condition (i) since
it is never optimal for players to choose infinite price as their action for any finite
quantity. We have assumed that ui also satisfies all the requirements of condition
(ii). Condition (iii) is satisfied since the choice variables of players are scalars.
Condition (iv) is satisfied if for any two aggregate actions of the others p′−i, p
′′
−i
with p′−i ≥ p
′′
−i (product order) the difference ui(pi, p
′
−i, P
f
i ) − ui(pi, p
′′
−i, P
f
i )
is increasing (or non-decreasing) in pi, which is assumed as well. Therefore
Γr(u, p) is supermodular game. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: It is an application of Theorem 6 in Milgrom and
Roberts (1990) with a slight difference. In their setting, the smallest and largest
pure strategy of the game depends on a scalar, but in our model it depends on a
vector. Nevertheless, the proof is immediate since we propose the smallest and
largest equilibria is nonincreasing with the fair price perception for any player
j, which is a scalar. As a result, if the vector increases in every component,
then the smallest and largest equilibria do not increase. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1: The stage game Γs(π, p) is obtained from the stage game
Γr(u, p) by setting α = 0. Thus, if Γr(u, p) is a supermodular game so is Γs(π, p).
This means that Γs(π, p) also has a smallest and a largest Nash equilibria in
pure-strategies. Denote these two equilibria by pns and pns, respectively. (i) If
pf−i = p
ns
−i then p
nr = pns = pn and ui(p
n, pf−i) = πi(p
n) since wij(p
n
j , p
f
ij) = 0
for all j. If pns−i < p
f
−i, then p
nr < pns by Proposition 1. These two inequalities
imply pnr−i < p
f
−i which together with (5) imply wij(p
nr
j , p
f
ij) < 0 for all j.
But then it follows that ui(p
nr, pf−i) < πi(p
ns) since pnr < pns implies that
wij(p
nr
j , p
f
ij) < 0 for all j and πi(p
nr) < πi(p
ns) for all i. The proof of (ii) is
similar. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: If pfij ∈ [p
ns
j , p
c
j ] for all i and j = i, then wij(p
c
j , p
f
ij) ≥ 0
and wij(p
nr
j , p
f
ij) ≤ 0, for all i and j = i. This in turn implies that
ui(p
c, pf−i) ≥ πi(p
c). (8)
We also know that
πi(p
c) > πi(p
ns) > πi(p
ns). (9)
If pfij ≥ p
ns
j for all i and j = i, then we know from Corollary 1 that
ui(p
nr, pf−i) ≤ πi(p
ns), and ui(p
nr, pf−i) ≤ πi(p
ns) (10)
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for all i. From (8), (9) and (10) we obtain
ui(p
c, pf−i) > ui(p
nr, pf−i) and ui(p
c, pf−i) > ui(p
nr, pf−i)
for all i, which by Friedman (1971) implies that there exists a discount factor
such that pc is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of Γr(u, p). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: By Friedman (1971) and Lemma 2, the assumptions
made imply that pc is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of Γs(π, p) and of
Γr(u, p). Next we show that the critical discount factor at which pc can be
sustained using grim trigger punishments in Γr∞(u, p) is lower than the critical
discount factor at which pc can be sustained using grim trigger punishments in
Γs∞(π, p), that is, δ
r
pc < δ
s
pc . From (2) and (3) sufficient conditions are that
ui(BR
r
i (p
c
−i), p
c
−i, p
f
−i)− ui(p
c, pf−i) ≤ πi(BR
s
i (p
c
−i), p
c
−i)− πi(p
c), (11)
and
ui(BR
r
i (p
c
−i), p
c
−i, p
f
−i)− ui(p
nr, pf−i) ≥ πi(BR
s
i (p
c
−i), p
c
−i)− πi(p
ns), (12)
where pnr = pnr and pns = pns or pnr = pnr and pns = pns. If pfij = p
c
j for all i
and j = i, then wij(p
c
j , p
f
ij) = 0 for all i and j = i which implies that
ui(p
c, pf−i) = πi(p
c), (13)
for all i, and
ui(BR
r
i (p
c
−i), p
c
−i, p
f
−i) = πi(BR
s
i (p
c
−i), p
c
−i), (14)
for all i. It follows from (13) and (14) that (11) is satisfied as an equality. If
pfij = p
c
j > p
ns
j for all i and j = i, then we know from Corollary 1 that
ui(p
nr, pf−i) ≤ πi(p
ns), and ui(p
nr, pf−i) ≤ πi(p
ns) (15)
for all i. It follows from (15) and (14) that (12) is satisfied. Thus δrpc ≤
δspc . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: By Friedman (1971) and Lemma 2, the assumptions
made imply that pc is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of Γs(π, p) and of
Γr(u, p). We want to show that the critical discount factor at which pc can be
sustained using grim trigger punishments in Γr∞(u, p) is lower than the critical
discount factor at which pc can be sustained using grim trigger punishments in
Γs∞(π, p), that is, δ
r
pc < δ
s
pc . From (2) and (3) sufficient conditions are that
ui(BR
r
i (p
c
−i), p
c
−i, p
f
−i)− ui(p
c, pf−i) ≤ πi(BR
s
i (p
c
−i), p
c
−i)− πi(p
c), (16)
and
ui(BR
r
i (p
c
−i), p
c
−i, p
f
−i)− ui(p
nr, pf−i) ≥ πi(BR
s
i (p
c
−i), p
c
−i)− πi(p
ns). (17)
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We start by showing that πi(pi, p−i) = (pi − ci)Di(pi, p−i) and p
f
ij ≤ p
c
j for all
j = i imply that (16) is satisfied as a strict inequality. We have that
ui(BR
r
i (p
c
−i), p
c
−i, p
f
−i)− ui(p
c, pf−i) = πi(BR
r
i (p
c
−i), p
c
−i)− πi(p
c)
+ α
∑
j =i
wij(p
c
j , p
f
ij)(p
c
j − cj)[Dj(BR
r
i (p
c
−i), p
c
−i)−Dj(p
c)]
≤ πi(BR
r
i (p
c
−i), p
c
−i)− πi(p
c) < πi(BR
s
i (p
c
−i), p
c
−i)− πi(p
c)
The equality is obtained from (4) and from the assumption πi(pi, p−i) = (pi −
ci)Di(pi, p−i). The weak inequality comes from the assumption that p
f
ij ≤ p
c
j
which implies wij(pcj , p
f
ij) ≥ 0, and the assumption that Dj is increasing with
pi which together with pdri < p
c
i imply Dj(BR
r
i (p
c
−i), p
c
−i) −Dj(p
c) < 0. The
strict inequality comes from the fact that BRsi (p
c
−i) is the best-reply to p
c
−i by
a self-interested player.
We now show that if pnsj ≤ p
f
ij for all j = i and α is sufficiently small, then (17)
is satisfied. Rewrite (17) as
[ui(BR
r
i (p
c
−i), p
c
−i, p
f
−i)− πi(BR
s
i (p
c
−i), p
c
−i)] + [πi(p
ns)− ui(p
nr, pf−i)] ≥ 0.
From Corollary 1 we have that
πi(p
ns)− ui(p
nr, pf−i) ≥ 0.
If pnsj ≤ p
f
ij for all j = i, then wij(pj , p
f
ij) ≥ 0 for all j = i. Taking a first-order
Taylor series expansion of ui(BR
r
i (p
c
−i), p
c
−i, p
f
−i) around α = 0 we obtain
ui(BR
r
i (p
c
−i), p
c
−i, p
f
−i) ≈ πi(BR
s
i (p
c
−i), p
c
−i))
+ α[
∑
j =i
wij(pj , p
f
ij)πj(BR
s
i (p
c
−i), p
c
−i)],
which is equivalent to
ui(BR
r
i (p
c
−i), p
c
−i, p
f
−i)− πi(BR
s
i (p
c
−i), p
c
−i) ≈
α[
∑
j =i
wij(pj , p
f
ij)πj(BR
s
i (p
c
−i), p
c
−i)] ≥ 0
Thus δrpc ≤ δ
s
pc . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: We need to show that Qf−i ∈ [Q
c
−i,Q
ns
−i] for all i,
implies δrqc ≤ δ
s
qc , where δ
r
qc is the critical discount factor above which q
c can
be sustained in Γr∞(u, q) and δ
s
qc is the critical discount factor above which q
c
can be sustained in Γs∞(π, q). From (2) and (3) sufficient conditions are that
ui(BR
r
i (Q
c
−i), Q
c
−i)− ui(q
c) ≤ πi(BR
s
i (Q
c
−i), Q
c
−i)− πi(q
c) (18)
and
ui(BR
r
i (Q
c
−i), Q
cs
−i)− ui(q
nr) ≥ πi(BR
s
i (Q
c
−i), Q
cs
−i)− πi(q
ns). (19)
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(i) We start by showing that Qf−i ∈ [Q
c
−i, Q
ns
−i] implies (18) is satisfied as a strict
inequality. We have that
ui(BR
r
i (Q
c
−i),Q
c
−i)− ui(q
c) = πi(BR
r
i (Q
c
−i), Q
c
−i)− πi(q
c)
+ αwi(Q
c
−i,Q
f
−i)
[
P (BRri (Q
c
−i) +Q
c
−i)− P (Q
c)
]
Qc−i
≤ πi(BR
r
i (Q
c
−i), Q
c
−i)− πi(q
c) < πi(BR
s
i (Q
c
−i), Q
c
−i)− πi(q
c)
The strict inequality follows from the fact thatBRsi (Q
c
−i) is the best reply toQ
c
−i
for self-interested players. If Qc−i ≤ Q
f
−i then wi(Q
c
−i,Q
f
−i) ≥ 0. Furthermore,
Qf−i ≤ Q
ns
−i implies BR
r
i (Q
c
−i) > q
c
i which in turn implies P (BR
r
i (Q
c
−i)+Q
c
−i) <
P (Qc), since P ′(·) < 0.
(ii) We now show that Qf−i ∈ [Q
c
−i, Q
ns
−i] implies that (19) is satisfied. Rewrite
(19) as
[ui(BR
r
i (Q
c
−i),Q
c
−i)− πi(BR
s
i (Q
c
−i), Q
c
−i)] + [πi(q
ns)− ui(q
nr)] ≥ 0.
We have that
ui(q
nr) = πi(q
nr) + αwi(Q
nr
−i, Q
f
−i)
∑
j =i
πj(q
nr) ≤ πi(q
ns).
The inequality follows from wi(Qnr−i, Q
f
−i) ≤ 0 and Proposition 3 in Santos-Pinto
(2006) which shows thatQf−i ≤ Q
ns
−i implies q
ns
i ≤ q
nr
i and πi(q
nr) ≤ πi(q
ns), for
all i. Taking a first-order Taylor series expansion of ui(BRri (Q
c
−i), Q
cs
−i) around
α = 0 we have that
ui(BR
r
i (Q
c
−i), Q
c
−i) ≈ πi(BR
s
i (Q
c
−i),Q
c
−i)
+α[wi(Q
c
−i, Q
f
−i)
∑
j =i
πj(BR
s
i (Q
c
−i), Q
c
−i)].
which is equivalent to
ui(BR
r
i (Q
c
−i),Q
c
−i)− πi(BR
s
i (Q
c
−i), Q
c
−i) ≈
α[wi(Q
c
−i, Q
f
−i)
∑
j =i
πj(BR
s
i (Q
c
−i), Q
c
−i)] ≥ 0
since Qc−i ≤ Q
f
−i implies that wi(Q
c
−i, Q
f
−i) ≥ 0. Thus, Q
f
−i ∈ [Q
c
−i, Q
ns
−i] for all
i, implies δrqc ≤ δ
s
qc . Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3: Since the assumptions are satisfied for u(.), this is an
application of Abreu (1988). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: The minimum critical discount factor will be ob-
tained if the inequality (6) and (7) hold with equality respectively for reciproca-
tors and self-interested players, otherwise the discount factor can be decreased
by a small amount without violating the inequality.
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In Proposition 3, we proved the LHS of the equations being smaller for recip-
rocators, hence a smaller discount level is possible for the reciprocators. In
addition, the following condition is immediate
vri (P˜
0; t+ 1) ≥ vsi (P˜
0; t+ 1)
considering the initial path where each player i sets at least the collusive price
pci for each stage, until one deviates. Hence for any fair price perception p
f
ij ∈
[pnsj , p
c
j ] for all i and j = i, the prices set at the initial path will be perceived
as kind behavior, thus the condition holds. Note that, if the prices set at the
initial path are equal to collusive prices pci for each player i and p
f
ij = p
c
j for all i
and i = i, then the condition holds with equality. Finally, to complete the proof
we need to compare the payoff of any player i in the optimal penal code vxi . In
the optimal penal code, the players punish the deviated player i via playing a
pure strategy profile σi ∈ Σp, which gives the lowest possible payoff to player i.
Let nxσ denote the strategy profile where in each stage players set Nash prices.
Since nxσ ∈ Σp, in each stage the optimal penal code for player i, vxi , is at least
as severe as nxσ, which means each player j sets p
j
≤ pnsj . Note that, if the
set prices in the penal code is such that p
j
= pnsj = p
f
ji for all j and i = j,
then the payoffs from the penal code are equal for self interested and reciprocal
player i, vri = v
s
i . Otherwise, the reciprocal players perceive the unkind behavior
and destructive reciprocity state implies the payoff under optimal penal code is
harsher for reciprocal players than self-interested players, that is vri < v
s
i . Since
all these conditions leads the reciprocators to have a smaller critical discount
factor than self-interested players, that is δrp0 < δ
s
p0 , we are done. Q.E.D.
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